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INTEREST OF AMICI 
 Amici are the Reporter for the Restatement (Third) 
of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, law professors 
and practicing lawyers who served as Advisers or on 
the Members Consultative Group to that Restate- 
ment, and law professors who study and publish on 
the law of restitution. Individual amici are further 
identified in the Appendix.1 
 The law of restitution and unjust enrichment is 
central to this case. Petitioners’ theory of standing 
proceeds in disregard of long established doctrines in 
the law of restitution and unjust enrichment. Respon- 
dent’s brief, by contrast, is squarely based on the law 
of restitution and unjust enrichment, but respondent 
does not appear to be fully aware of how extensively 
she relies on that law. The risk is great that in 
deciding this case, the Court may inadvertently 
disrupt an important body of law that long predates 
the American founding and that serves essential 
functions, especially in private law but in parts of 
public law as well. 
   This brief explains the law of restitution and 
unjust enrichment and how the Court would disrupt 
that long established law if it were to adopt 
petitioners’ reasoning. These amici take no position 
                     
1  This brief was prepared entirely by amici and their 
counsel. No person other than amici and their counsel made any 
financial contribution to the preparation or submission of this 
brief. The consents of the parties are on file with the Clerk. 
The American Law Institute speaks only through its 
Restatements, Principles of the Law, and similar projects. Each 
such project is carefully reviewed and formally approved by both 
its governing Council and its membership. This brief is not a 
statement of the American Law Institute. 
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on the underlying statutory claim or on the meaning 
of the statute. 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Petitioners’ argument that there is no standing in 
this case would wreak havoc with the law of 
restitution and unjust enrichment, barring many long 
established causes of action from federal court.  
 The law of restitution and unjust enrichment is a 
longstanding part of Anglo-American law. It creates 
remedies and causes of action that are based on gain 
to defendant rather than loss to plaintiff. It follows 
that in appropriate cases, the law of restitution and 
unjust enrichment may impose liability for unjust 
enrichment even though plaintiff has no claim for 
compensatory damages, or no claim for compensatory 
damages that can be proved at reasonable expense. 
Such causes of action and remedies were part of 
English law before the American founding, and they 
have been part of American law ever since.  
 Standing necessarily depends on the type of relief 
sought. A plaintiff may have standing to sue for 
damages but not standing to sue for an injunction, or 
vice versa. And similarly, a plaintiff may have 
standing to sue for restitution of unjust enrichment 
without having standing to sue for damages or an 
injunction. 
 Standing in the law of restitution and unjust 
enrichment requires the restitution plaintiff to show 
that he is the source of defendant’s enrichment, either 
in the sense that he suffered a loss that corresponds 
to defendant’s gain, or in the sense that defendant’s 
gain was acquired by violating plaintiff’s rights. 
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These rules are deeply embedded in the substantive 
law of restitution, and only occasionally are they 
labeled as standing rules. But they serve the same 
function as standing rules: they confine the right to 
sue to identifiable individuals with a concrete stake in 
the litigation.  
 These standing rules may be reconciled with cases 
interpreting Article III in either of two ways, and the 
choice of explanation does not affect the result. First, 
the violation of plaintiff’s rights that leads to 
defendant’s unjust enrichment may be recognized as 
injury in fact. Alternatively, injury in fact may be 
dismissed as irrelevant, because the whole focus of 
the claim is on defendant’s gain, not plaintiff’s loss. 
Courts have relied on both explanations. 
 These amici take no position on any of the 
statutory issues presented by respondent’s claim in 
this case. The limited grant of certiorari requires the 
assumption that the statute creates the cause of 
action recognized by the court of appeals. If this Court 
were to hold that Congress cannot constitutionally 
create such a cause of action, the apparent 
implication would be that no plaintiff has standing to 
assert any claim in restitution and unjust enrichment 
without first demonstrating that he could also have 
sued for compensatory damages. Such a holding 
would bar many longstanding state-law claims from 
the diversity jurisdiction and would hold 






I. A Plaintiff With a Claim in Restitution and 
Unjust Enrichment Has Standing to Sue in 
Federal Court. 
A. The Law of Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment Is Based on Defendant’s 
Gain, Not Plaintiff’s Loss. 
 Compensatory damages, based on plaintiff’’s loss, 
and restitution of unjust enrichment, based on 
defendant’s gain, are fundamentally distinct. Each 
kind of claim ends in a monetary remedy, but both the 
remedies and the causes of action have different 
conceptual bases, different histories, and different 
measures of recovery.  
 These differences are long established and utterly 
uncontroversial. As summarized in the standard 
American treatises, “[R]estitution is measured by the 
defendant’s gains, not by the plaintiff’s losses.” 1 Dan 
B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies: Damages - Equity - 
Restitution §1.1 at 5 (2d ed. 1993). “[I]n the damage 
action the plaintiff seeks to recover for the harm done 
to him, whereas in the restitution action he seeks to 
recover the gain acquired by the defendant through 
the wrongful act.” 1 George E. Palmer, The Law of 
Restitution §2.1 at 51 (1978).2 
 Very often, an unjust gain to defendant will be 
matched by a corresponding loss to plaintiff. If $100 is 
misappropriated, or paid by mistake, defendant has 
gained $100 and plaintiff has lost $100. But 
                     
 2 See also, e.g., 1 Dobbs at 280, 552, 555; Douglas Laycock, 
Modern American Remedies: Cases and Materials 622-23, 651-52 
(4th ed. 2010); Doug Rendleman & Caprice Roberts, Remedies: 
Cases and Materials 473 (8th ed. 2011). 
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sometimes, plaintiff’s loss is smaller than defendant’s 
gain. And sometimes, plaintiff has no loss measurable 
in dollars at all. But such a plaintiff may still have a 
claim in restitution and unjust enrichment, because 
the basis of the claim is defendant’s gain, not 
plaintiff’s loss. 
 The new Restatement summarizes the basic 
principle as its predecessors summarized it: “A person 
who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is 
subject to liability in restitution.” Restatement (Third) 
of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment §1 (2011) (here- 
inafter Restatement (Third)).3 It further explains in 
the first paragraph of the first Comment: 
While the paradigm case of unjust enrichment 
is one in which the benefit on one side of the 
transaction corresponds to an observable loss 
on the other, the consecrated formula “at the 
expense of another” can also mean “in violation 
of the other’s legally protected rights,” without 
the need to show that the claimant has suffered 
a loss. See §3. 
Restatement (Third) §1 cmt. a (emphasis added). 
 Section 3, also closely tracking its predecessors, 
says simply that “A person is not permitted to profit 
by his own wrong.” The first Comment makes two 
important points about this principle. First: 
The present section marks one of the 
cornerstones of the law of restitution and 
unjust enrichment. The general principle it 
identifies is the one underlying the 
                     
 3 Accord, Restatement (Second) of Restitution §1 (Tentative 
Draft No. 1, 1983); Restatement of Restitution §1 (1937). 
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“disgorgement” remedies in restitution, where- 
by a claimant potentially recovers more than a 
provable loss so that the defendant may be 
stripped of a wrongful gain. 
Id. §3 cmt. a.  
Second, the broad principle that no man may 
profit by his own wrong “identifies an outlook and an 
objective, not a cause of action.” Ibid. “Working rules” 
that describe specific causes of action come in later 
sections, where liability for defendant’s wrongful 
profits is generally confined to fiduciary and 
confidential relationships and to conscious 
wrongdoers. And some statutes, most notably the 
Copyright Act, impose liability for unjust enrichment 
without a showing that a violation was knowing or 
intentional.4  
B. Many Familiar Causes of Action for 
Unjust Enrichment Do Not Require Proof 
of Compensable Injury to Plaintiff. 
 Petitioners do not appear to define the Ainjury@ 
they would require to give a plaintiff standing. But 
petitioners’ working definition appears to be that a 
plaintiff suing for a past wrong must be eligible to 
recover compensatory damages. This definition is 
implicit in petitioners’ recurring statements equating 
injury with compensation in damages, often 
italicizing the word “compensation.” Pet. Br. 17, 24, 
35 n.17, 40, 46. 
 Petitioners’ argument is oblivious to the law of 
restitution and unjust enrichment. Many familiar 
                     
 4 See, e.g., Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 
482-83 (9th Cir. 2000) (reviewing opinions on “subconscious” 
copying from Learned Hand forward). 
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causes of action can support a restitutionary remedy 
in which plaintiff recovers defendant’s unjust 
enrichment, without proof of damages or of any 
compensable injury to plaintiff. Plaintiffs in these 
cases may have suffered no damages, or, what is the 
same thing for most practical purposes, may have 
suffered no damages that can be proved and 
quantified at reasonable expense. These causes of 
action and their remedies are available even if it is 
clear that plaintiff suffered no damages at all in any 
economic sense. In nearly all of these cases, the key to 
plaintiff’s standing is that defendant enriched himself 
by violating plaintiff’s legally protected rights. 
1. Two General Points About the 
Examples That Follow.  
 This brief will offer many examples of long 
established causes of action without compensable 
injury. In considering these examples, it is important 
to keep in mind two more general points.  
 a. The relationship between injury in fact 
and compensable injury. In nearly all the 
examples that follow, there was a violation of a legally 
protected interest of the plaintiff. One way to explain 
these cases is to say that there was an injury in fact to 
this protected interest, even though there was no 
compensable injury. But if that explanation is 
accepted for all these long established claims in 
restitution and unjust enrichment, then it is equally 
available for respondent’s claim here. That is, if 
petitioners explain all the law of restitution and 
unjust enrichment as involving an injury in fact, then 
respondent can explain her claim the same way. 
 The other way to explain these cases is to say, 
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more simply, that a cause of action in restitution and 
unjust enrichment is based on defendant’s gain, and 
that injury to the plaintiff is simply irrelevant. 
 Courts have written these opinions both ways. 
Some opinions rather clearly say that plaintiff can 
recover defendant’s unjust enrichment without proof 
of any injury to plaintiff. See, e.g., Jackson v. Smith, 
254 U.S. 586 (1921). Other opinions rather clearly say 
that defendant’s violation of plaintiff’s legal rights is 
an injury to plaintiff, even though measurable 
damages appear to be zero. See, e.g., Olwell v. Nye & 
Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652 (Wash. 1946). And of course, 
many opinions simply apply the law of restitution and 
do not attend to conceptual underpinnings. The result 
is the same under either explanation: plaintiff can sue 
for defendant’s unjust enrichment without proof of 
compensable injury. 
 b. Fiduciary duty does not explain these 
cases. Petitioners would apparently confine these 
cases to fiduciaries. Pet. Br. 33. Respondent replies 
that Congress can impose some of the duties and 
liabilities of fiduciaries without imposing all the 
duties and liabilities of fiduciaries, Resp. Br. 31-32, 
and that is undoubtedly correct. But there is much 
more to be said.  
 First, the duty of loyalty, which originally arose in 
fiduciary relationships, now applies to other 
confidential relationships that courts are unwilling to 
characterize as fully fiduciary. See Restatement 
(Third) §43(a), (b). See also Comment f (“Confidential 
relation where defendant not a fiduciary”) and 
reporter’s note f. Both categories — fiduciary duties 




 This liability extends also to the unjust 
enrichment of one who receives a benefit “in 
consequence of another’s breach” of a fiduciary duty 
or confidential relationship. Restatement (Third) 
§43(c) and cmt. g. This brief takes no position on the 
meaning of the statute at issue in this case. But if 
that statute makes petitioners liable for gains derived 
from the misconduct of their affiliate, Tower City, 
that liability would be entirely parallel to the 
longstanding law on profits accruing to one person 
from another person’s breach of a fiduciary or confi- 
dential relationship.  
 Second, liability for unjust enrichment without 
proof of compensable injury to plaintiff is not confined 
to fiduciary or confidential relationships. We offer 
examples below of liability for unjust enrichment, 
without proof of compensable injury, on the part of 
defendants without the slightest whiff of fiduciary 
duty or confidential relationship — cases of 
infringers, trespassers, converters, fraudsters, and 
contract breachers. The basic category here is 
fiduciaries or conscious wrongdoers. Restatement 
(Third) §51(4). 
 Third, and more fundamental, petitioners’ 
argument about fiduciary duty goes only to the 
merits. It does not go to the existence of a 
constitutional case or controversy. If a trust 
beneficiary has standing to recover his trustee’s 
unjust enrichment, without evidence of compensable 
injury to the beneficiary, then there is no Article III 
barrier to the creation of analogous claims for other 
plaintiffs to recover unjust enrichment without proof 
of compensable injury.  
 Article III authorizes jurisdiction over various 
10 
 
categories of “Cases” and “Controversies.” It does not 
say “cases, controversies, and claims against 
fiduciaries.” Plaintiffs can sue fiduciaries in unjust 
enrichment without proof of compensable injury 
because such claims present a case or controversy — 
not because there is something constitutionally 
special about fiduciaries. 
2. Familiar Claims in Restitution and 
Unjust Enrichment Without Compen- 
sable Injury to Plaintiff. 
 We turn now to illustrations of liability in unjust 
enrichment without compensable injury to plaintiff. 
 a. Commercial bribes and kickbacks. 
Prominent among these restitutionary claims to 
defendant’s profits are the cases on which Congress 
appears to have modeled the cause of action in this 
case — claims arising from commercial bribes and 
kickbacks. What respondent accurately describes as 
the “no-further-inquiry rule,” Resp. Br. 21-38, is 
enforced by causes of action that are more broadly 
classified as claims in restitution and unjust 
enrichment. 
 An employer can recover any bribe or kickback 
paid to his employee, without proof that the quality of 
the employee’s services or the terms of any 
transaction were actually affected by the bribe or 
kickback. The rule is the same for a client who is 
entitled to honest and loyal services from a 
professional or a service provider. If seller bribes a 
buyer’s agent to buy from seller, the agent’s employer 
can recover the amount of the bribe even if the sales 
were at the market price and there is no evidence of 
any injury to the buyer. Restatement (Third) §43 illus. 
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17-19 & reporter’s note d (collecting cases); id. §44 
illus. 9 & reporter’s note b; Restatement (Third) of 
Agency §8.02 and cmt. b (2006) (“it is not necessary 
that the principal show that the agent’s acquisition of 
a material benefit harmed the principal.”)  
 As the Minnesota court explained: 
 It matters not that the principal has 
suffered no damage or even that the 
transaction has been profitable to him. . . . 
 “Actual injury is not the principle the law 
proceeds on, in holding such transactions void. 
Fidelity in the agent is what is aimed at, and, 
as a means of securing it, the law will not 
permit him to place himself in a position in 
which he may be tempted by his own private 
interests to disregard those of his principal. . . . 
It is not material that no actual injury to the 
company (principal) resulted, or that the policy 
recommended may have been for its best 
interest.”  
Tarnowski v. Resop, 51 N.W.2d 801, 803 (Minn. 1952), 
quoting Lum v. McEwen (Lum v. Clark), 57 N.W. 662, 
662-63 (Minn. 1894). 
 These causes of action are an important tool in the 
fight against government corruption, and govern- 
ments, including the United States, are frequent 
plaintiffs in such cases. See, e.g., United States v. 
Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 305-09 (1910) (quoted at Resp. 
Br. 26); United States v. Podell, 572 F.2d 31, 34-35 (2d 
Cir. 1978); Continental Management, Inc. v. United 
States, 527 F.2d 613, 615-17 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (holding 
that government can recover the bribe from the 
briber, instead of the bribee, and collecting cases). 
12 
 
 b. Business opportunities. Another example, 
with ancient roots, is trustees or agents who take for 
themselves business opportunities that might have 
been of interest to their beneficiaries or principals. 
 This body of law begins at least as early as Keech 
v. Sanford, 25 Eng. Rep. 223 (Ch. 1726), briefly 
described at Resp. Br. 21. A landlord refused to renew 
a lease to a trust for a minor, and instead leased the 
property to the trustee individually. “[T]here was 
clear proof of the refusal to renew for the benefit of 
the infant,” id. at 223, and the Lord Chancellor did 
not doubt the fact. So the beneficiary of the trust had 
not lost the lease due to any action by the trustee. 
 The beneficiary had suffered no injury in fact 
unless the impairment of the trustee’s undivided 
loyalty and the risk that harm might have ensued 
counts as injury in fact. But the Lord Chancellor said 
that the absence of harm could not change the result: 
“it is very proper that rule should be strictly pursued, 
and not in the least relaxed.” Ibid. Note too that the 
Chancellor treated this decision as an application of 
an already settled rule. For modern variations on 
Keech v. Sanford, see Restatement (Third) §43 illus. 1 
and reporter’s note b. 
 From these beginnings, there has grown the whole 
modern law of corporate opportunities. Partners, 
directors, officers, agents, and the like cannot take for 
themselves a business opportunity that might have 
been of interest to their principal. If they do so, they 
are liable to the principal for all their profits from the 
opportunity. The plaintiff need not show that it would 
have invested in the opportunity itself, and therefore, 
it need not show that it suffered any compensable 
injury. Restatement (Third) §43 illus. 14-15 and 
13 
 
reporter’s note d; American Law Institute, Principles 
of Corporate Governance §§ 5.05, 5.12 (1992) and 
reporter’s notes; Restatement (Third) of Agency §8.02 
and cmt. d. 
 A famous illustration is Justice Cardozo’s opinion 
in Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). The 
opportunity there was to take a lease on a much 
larger tract, for a much longer term, requiring much 
more capital, than the original lease in the joint 
venture between the parties. Id. at 545-46. But it was 
not for defendant to decide whether his joint 
adventurer would have been willing and able to 
participate. “No answer is it to say that the chance 
would have been of little value even if seasonably 
offered.” Id. at 547. One who improperly takes a 
business opportunity for himself is liable for his 
profits, whether or not the victim suffered 
compensable injury.    
 c. Other conflicts of interest. The rule that 
applies to bribes and kickbacks and to corporate 
opportunities applies with equal rigor to other 
transactions conducted under the potential influence 
of a conflict of interest. The principal or beneficiary in 
such a case can sue to recover the unjust enrichment 
of his agent or trustee without proof of compensable 
injury. Or, he can sue to rescind or set aside the 
transaction without proof of either compensable 
injury to plaintiff or any gain to defendant. 
Restatement (Third) of Agency §8.01 cmt. d(1) and 
reporter’s note d(1) (summarizing both remedies).  
 Thus, it is a settled rule, once again with ancient 
roots, that a receiver or trustee of the assets of an 
insolvent debtor cannot buy at his own sale, even if 
the sale is conducted at a public auction and the 
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trustee is the high bidder. Resp. Br. 21-25; Restate- 
ment (Third) §43 illus. 20 & reporter’s note d. 
 Respondent cites many cases illustrating this rule, 
including several from this Court. Another revealing 
example in this Court is Jackson v. Smith, 254 U.S. 
586 (1921). In Jackson, “it affirmatively appear[ed] 
that the sale was fairly conducted, that there was 
competitive bidding, and that the property was finally 
knocked down to the highest bidder.” Id. at 587. But 
this high bidder was a group that included the trustee 
responsible for conducting the sale, and the group 
went on to make profits with the property it had 
purchased. The Court unanimously held that the 
trustee and his confederates were liable “for all the 
profits obtained by him and those who were 
associated with him in the matter, although the estate 
may not have been injured thereby.” Id. at 589 
(emphasis added). 
 Another striking example is Mosser v. Darrow, 341 
U.S. 267 (1951). There, the employees of a 
reorganization trustee traded in the securities of the 
enterprise undergoing reorganization. The trustee 
who employed them and allowed them to trade was 
held personally liable for their profits, although he 
had not traded for his own account and had no 
improper profits of his own. The trustee argued that 
his employees had caused no loss, and even that their 
purchases of securities had supported the price and 
been beneficial to the reorganizing enterprise. Id. at 
272. The Court was not so sure of that, but its 
fundamental holding was the now familiar point that 
it did not matter. Id. at 273. The plaintiff could 
recover the profits of a conflicted transaction, without 




 Another variation arises when an agent or trustee 
borrows, formally or informally, assets of the 
principal or of the trust, and uses those assets to 
profit personally. The borrower is liable for his 
personal profits no matter how clear it may be that no 
harm was done. A clear example is Slay v. Burnett 
Trust, 187 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. 1945). The trustees 
borrowed money from the trust to invest personally in 
a speculative venture. They gave an interest-bearing 
note secured by deeds of trust on real property and oil 
and gas interests, id. at 385, and they had repaid 
most of the loan by the time of trial, id. at 387. Almost 
certainly the speculative investment would have been 
inappropriate for the trust. But the trustees were 
liable to the trust for the profits on the speculative 
investment, because they had improperly used trust 
assets to make the profit. Id. at 387-89. 
 Similarly if a corporate officer uses any of the 
corporation’s property for his own benefit, he is liable 
to the corporation for any resulting profit or benefit. 
American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate 
Governance §5.04(a), (c) (1992). 
 d. Disgorgement of fees. An agent, attorney, or 
other fiduciary who breaches a duty of loyalty may 
forfeit fees to which he would otherwise be entitled. 
Restatement (Third) of Agency §8.01 cmt. d(2) (2006); 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers 
§37 (2000). If he has already collected those fees, the 
client may sue to recover them. Id. cmt. a. The 
fiduciary would be unjustly enriched if he retained 
fees that he had forfeited by his disloyalty. 
 When the client sues to recover all or an allocable 
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portion of the fees, he need not show that the disloyal 
act caused compensable injury. See, e.g., Burrow v. 
Arce, 997 S.W.3d 229, 237-40 (Tex. 1999); see id. at 
239 nn.36-37 (collecting authorities). 
 This rule too appears to have been part of the 
model for the statutory cause of action in this case. 
Liability is triggered by a bribe or kickback, but the 
measure of recovery is based on the fees paid, perhaps 
because that amount is fully known to customers and 
therefore easier to prove.  
 e. Infringement of intellectual property. 
Examples far removed from fiduciary duty arise in 
the law of intellectual property. One who infringes 
the intellectual property of another is generally liable 
for either his own profits or the victim’s losses. 17 
U.S.C. §504(b) (copyright); 15 U.S.C. §1117(a) (2006) 
(trademark); Uniform Trade Secrets Act §3(a), 14 
Unif. Laws Ann. 633 (2005) (trade secret). Liability 
for profits has been repealed in patent infringement, 
except for design patents, 35 U.S.C. §§ 284, 289 
(2006), for policy reasons having nothing whatever to 
do with standing or the existence of cases and 
controversies. 
 If the infringer takes sales away from the victim of 
infringement, plaintiff will have losses and defendant 
will have gains that may be either more or less than 
plaintiff’s damages. Plaintiff can generally sue for 
whichever is larger. 
 It not infrequently happens that the infringer 
expands the market, or creates a derivative work that 
is infringing but not duplicative, so that the infringer 
has substantial profits from infringing sales, but the 
plaintiff has no lost sales and no damages. In such a 
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case, plaintiff can recover defendant’s profits without 
proof of any compensable injury. Restatement (Third) 
§42 illus. 7-9 and reporter’s note g. 
 A copyright example is Three Boys Music Corp. v. 
Bolton, 212 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 2000), where defendant 
produced a hit song in 1991 that infringed another hit 
from 1964. The infringer was liable for the portion of 
his profits attributable to the infringement, estimated 
by the jury at 18%.5 But it is hard to imagine that the 
plaintiff lost any sales of his 1964 song in 1991. 
 A leading trademark example is Maier Brewing 
Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d 117 (9th 
Cir. 1968), where the maker of an inexpensive beer 
copied the trademark of a well known scotch whisky. 
The infringer profited from his deliberate infringe- 
ment, but plaintiff did not claim that it had lost any 
sales of whisky. Defendants plausibly argued that 
plaintiffs had shown “no injury to themselves, no 
diversion of sales from them to the appellants, no 
direct competition from which injury may be 
inferable.” Id. at 120.  
 The leading case in this Court is Sheldon v. 
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390 (1940), 
where MGM plagiarized the script of a play and made 
a major movie. Damages to the copyright holder 
might have been zero, and were at most quite modest 
                     
 5  The infringing song was sold on an album. The jury 
attributed 28% of the profits of the album to the infringing song, 
and 66% of the profits of that song to the infringement. 212 F.3d 
at 487. The net result was that 28% of 66%, or 18.48% of the 
profits of the album, were attributable to the infringement. Such 
estimates are unavoidable in copyright litigation, and were 
approved by this Court in Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures 
Corp., 309 U.S. 390 (1940). 
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compared to the profits from the movie. The Court 
affirmed a judgment for 20% of the profits from the 
movie, based on the lower court’s estimate of the 
highest proportion of the profits that might possibly 
have been attributable to the plagiarized script. Id. at 
408-09. 
 The rule allowing recovery of the infringer’s 
profits is sufficiently settled that although this Court 
decides many intellectual property cases, it has not 
returned in recent years to issues of how to measure 
the infringer’s profits. Numerous earlier cases are 
cited in Sheldon. See also Mishawaka Rubber & 
Woolen Manufacturing Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 
U.S. 203 (1942), awarding a trademark infringer’s 
profits. 
 f. Harmless but profitable trespasses. A 
trespasser is liable for compensatory damages, for 
nominal damages in the absence of any actual 
damage,6 or for the profits of the trespass, Restate- 
ment (Third) §40.  
 There are well known examples in which the 
trespass was harmless, because plaintiff was not 
using his land or was not even capable of using his 
land. But he could still sue for the profits of a 
substantial commercial trespass. In Raven Red Ash 
Coal Co. v. Ball, 39 S.E.2d 231 (Va. 1946), defendant 
had an easement to build a railroad across plaintiff’s 
land and to transport on that railroad coal mined 
from specified tracts of land. Without authorization, 
defendant also transported coal mined from 
additional tracts. Defendant argued that the only 
remedy should be nominal damages for the tort. The 
                     
 6 Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts ' 50 at 97 (2000).  
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Virginia court disagreed, awarding instead the value 
of the benefit wrongfully acquired: 
The illegal transportation of the coal in 
question across plaintiff's land was intentional, 
deliberate and repeated from time to time for a 
period of years. . . . To limit plaintiff to the 
recovery of nominal damages for the repeated 
trespasses will enable defendant, as a 
trespasser, to obtain a more favorable position 
than a party contracting for the same right. 
Natural justice plainly requires the law to 
imply a promise to pay a fair value of the 
benefits received. Defendant's estate has been 
enhanced by just this much. 
Id. at 238; Restatement (Third) §40 illus. 2. 
 Another well known example is Edwards v. Lee’s 
Administrator, 96 S.W.2d 1028 (Ky. 1936); 
Restatement (Third) §40 illus. 4, §51 illus. 13. 
Edwards, who owned the mouth of the Great Onyx 
Cave, developed and exploited the entire cave as a 
tourist attraction. About one-third of the cave was 
Lee’s property — 360 feet below the surface and 
inaccessible to Lee. 96 S.W.2d at 1030. The court did 
not find any compensatory damages; instead, it 
awarded one-third of the profits from the cave to Lee. 
“[W]e are led inevitably to the conclusion that the 
measure of recovery in this case must be the benefits, 
or net profits, received by appellants from the use of 
the property of the appellees.” 96 S.W.2d at 1032. 
Reviewing similar rules in a range of factual contexts, 
the court said that “The philosophy of all these 
decisions is that a wrongdoer shall not be permitted 
to make a profit from his own wrong.” Ibid. 
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g. Harmless but profitable conversions. 
Similar facts can arise in conversion. A well known 
example is Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652 
(Wash. 1946). Defendant “borrowed” the plaintiff’s 
egg-washing machine, without authorization, and 
used it in his business for more than three years until 
discovered. Plaintiff had stored the machine in a 
space adjacent to defendant’s business site, had no 
current use for it, and did not know that defendant 
was using it. Defendant plausibly argued that 
plaintiff had suffered no loss.  
 The court said that plaintiff had suffered a loss, at 
least in the abstract, but the remedy it affirmed was a 
judgment for defendant’s profits from using the 
machine. “To hold otherwise would be subversive of 
all property rights since his use was admittedly 
wrongful and without claim of right. The theory of 
unjust enrichment is applicable in such a case.” Id. at 
654; Restatement (Third) §40 illus. 17.    
 h. Rescission.  Rescission of transactions is 
another familiar restitutionary remedy that need not 
be accompanied by compensable injury. If one party to 
a contract commits a material breach, by repudiation 
or substantial failure to perform, the other party is 
entitled to get his money back, even if performance 
would have been worthless and contract damages 
would have been zero. Mobil Oil Exploration & 
Producing Southeast, Inc. v. United States, 530 U.S. 
604 (2000); Restatement (Third) §37 illus. 1. After 
reviewing the underlying principles, id. at 607-08, 
and resolving various preliminary issues, the Court 
turned to the facts. The government convincingly 
argued that Mobil had suffered no damages, but the 
Court said that did not matter. 
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This argument, however, misses the basic legal 
point. The oil companies do not seek damages 
for breach of contract. They seek restitution of 
their initial payments. Because the Govern- 
ment repudiated the lease contracts, the law 
entitles the companies to that restitution 
whether the contracts would, or would not, 
ultimately have produced a financial gain or 
led them to obtain a definite right to explore. If 
a lottery operator fails to deliver a purchased 
ticket, the purchaser can get his money back — 
whether or not he eventually would have won 
the lottery.  
Id. at 623-24. 
 The rule is the same when a transaction is 
rescinded for fraud. “Rescission of a transfer induced 
by fraud or material misrepresentation requires no 
showing either that the transferor has suffered 
economic injury (the requirement in tort) or that the 
transferee has realized a benefit at the transferor’s 
expense (the standard condition of unjust 
enrichment).” Restatement (Third) §13 cmt. e; see 
illus. 7-9 and reporter’s note e. If plaintiff has been 
deceived on a point that matters to him, he can undo 
the transaction, whether or not the point of the 
deception has a value measurable in dollars. 
 i. Misuse of confidential information. A 
person who misuses confidential information is liable 
for any profits he makes as a result — whether or not 
the person entitled to control the information suffers 
a compensable injury. An example in this Court is 
Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980), where a 
CIA agent published a book about his work without 
submitting the manuscript for review by the agency. 
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The government made no effort to prove damages. 
The Court believed the government had been harmed 
but that any damages were “unquantifiable.” Id. at 
514. The Court granted a constructive trust over all 
proceeds of the book. 
 The rule is the same in more prosaic contexts such 
as trade secrets. One who misappropriates a trade 
secret is liable for his profits, whether or not plaintiff 
proves any damages. Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
§3(a), 14 Unif. Laws Ann. 633 (2005). 
 The whole civil law of insider trading depends on 
this rule. When the insider uses corporate infor- 
mation to profit by trading in the corporation’s 
securities, the corporation can recover those profits 
without pleading or proving any compensable injury 
to the corporation. Restatement (Third) §43 illus. 9 
and reporter’s note c; American Law Institute, 
Principles of Corporate Governance §5.04(a), (c) 
(1992); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 
(N.Y. 1969). The cause of action is to recover 
defendant’s profits, see, e.g., SEC v. Warde, 151 F.3d 
42, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1998), and it is probably rare in 
such cases for the corporation to have any 
compensable injury. 
 j. The slayer rule. If a person in position to 
inherit property on the death of another feloniously 
kills that other person, the slayer does not get to keep 
the property he inherits. Restatement (Third) §45. 
The rule is the same if the slayer would acquire the 
property through life insurance, joint tenancy with 
right of survivorship, or any other means by which 
property passes at death. Ibid.  
 The property passes instead to the person next in 
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line, usually the person who would have inherited the 
property if the slayer had predeceased the victim. 
§45(3). Very often, that person has no compensable 
injury, and no legally protected interest, under the 
wrongful death act. The person who inherits in lieu of 
the slayer may be an adult child of the victim, a 
sibling, a nephew, or a first cousin once removed. If 
that person was not financially dependent on the 
victim, and not on the short list of other potential 
plaintiffs listed in the wrongful death acts of some 
states, he cannot sue for wrongful death. 
 It is unimaginable that this body of law would be 
held unconstitutional and stricken from the books. 
Yet the cause of action is vested in a person — the 
substitute heir or beneficiary — who may have no 
compensable injury and no legally protected interest. 
The cause of action is vested in the most appropriate 
plaintiff, and that plaintiff has a clear personal stake 
in the litigation. 
* * * * * 
 The point of all these examples is that plaintiffs 
who suffered no compensable injury can often sue to 
recover or prevent a defendant’s unjust enrichment. 
Large, diverse, and important areas of law would be 
thrown into confusion by an opinion suggesting that 
an unjust enrichment plaintiff must show injury in 
fact and that injury in fact may be equated with 
compensable injury or economic loss.  
C. These Causes of Action for Plaintiffs Who 
Suffered No Compensable Injury Long 
Predate the American Founding. 
 The law of restitution and unjust enrichment has 
ancient roots. It developed independently in the 
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courts of equity and in the courts of common law 
before the American founding. These cases were part 
of “the traditional concern of the courts at 
Westminster.” Vermont Agency of Natural Resources 
v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774 
(2000) (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 
(1939) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)). The history is 
briefly reviewed in the comments and reporter’s notes 
to Restatement (Third) §4. 
 Respondent offers an accurate account of some of 
the pre-founding and founding-era cases. Resp. Br. 
21-23. These are cases in which the Chancellor 
granted an accounting of profits — an order that 
defendant account for any profits wrongfully earned 
and pay those profits over to the plaintiff — even 
though plaintiff proved no damages and appears to 
have suffered no compensable injury. In addition, con- 
flicted transactions were set aside, whether or not 
plaintiff had any damages or defendant had any 
profits. We have already described Keech v. Sanford, 
supra at 12, in which the Lord Chancellor awarded an 
accounting of a trustee’s profits from a lease even 
though the landlord had expressly refused to renew 
the lease with the trust as a tenant. That was in 1726, 
and the core of the rule appears to have already been 
settled. 
 The other early cases cited by respondent are 
equally clear. The trustee in Whelpdale v. Cookson, 27 
Eng. Rep. 856 (Ch. 1747), cited at Resp. Br. 21, was 
the highest bidder at a public sale, but suit lay to set 
aside the sale on the ground that the trustee had 
acted both as buyer and seller. The facts are more 
fully stated in Whelpdale v. Cookson, 28 Eng. Rep. 
440 (Ch. 1747), where the reporter of decisions says 
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that “The doctrine is not confined to Trustees, but 
extends to Assignees under Commissions of 
Bankrupt, Solicitors, Agents, and in short all persons 
having a confidential character,” citing numerous 
cases. Id. at 441. 
 The reporter there also notes that the authority of 
Whelpdale had “been doubted” by Lord Eldon in Ex 
parte Lacey, 31 Eng. Rep. 1228, 1229, 6 Vesey Jr. 626, 
628 (Ch. 1802). Lord Eldon’s “doubt” was that 
Whelpdale had not gone far enough. The Lord 
Chancellor in Whelpdale had said that a majority of 
the creditors could ratify a sale to a bankruptcy 
trustee who bought at his own sale. But Lord Eldon 
insisted in Lacey that the majority could not waive 
the rights of the minority, and that only unanimous 
consent by all the creditors could ratify such a sale. 
 There were many of these cases in early modern 
England, as indicated in Resp. Br. 21-23 & n.4, and in 
the discussion and citations in the opinions. The 
Chancellors discuss these cases as a recurring 
problem. They insist that neither harm to plaintiff 
nor gain to defendant need be proved; there is a cause 
of action to set aside the sales because the temptation 
to abuse is ever present, and whether there is actual 
injury or gain is too difficult to determine. As Lord 
Eldon explained: 
[The rule] is founded upon this; that though 
you may see in a particular case, that he has 
not made advantage, it is utterly impossible to 
examine upon satisfactory evidence in the 
power of the Court, by which I mean, in the 
power of the parties, in ninety-nine cases out of 




Ex parte Lacey, 31 Eng. Rep. at 1229.  
 So the courts dispensed with proof of loss to 
plaintiff; they dispensed even with proof of gain to 
defendant. It was enough to support a cause of action 
that there was a duty of loyalty and a temptation to 
profit at the plaintiff’s expense. 
D. The Requirements of Standing Nece- 
ssarily Depend on the Relief Plaintiff 
Seeks. 
1. Standing in Suits for Damages and 
Injunctions.  
 A plaintiff must show “that he has standing for 
each type of relief sought.” Summers v. Earth Island 
Institute, 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149 (2009), citing City of 
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983). The 
reason plaintiff must separately show standing for 
each type of relief sought is that the precise 
requirements for standing necessarily vary with the 
type of relief sought. There is no uniform rule of 
standing that applies without change to every type of 
relief. 
In Lyons, this Court acknowledged that plaintiff 
had standing to sue for compensatory damages but 
held that he lacked standing to sue for an injunction. 
Plaintiff had suffered the damages, so he had 
standing to sue for those, but he was not sufficiently 
threatened with a repetition to have standing to sue 
for an injunction. 
 Many other cases are the reverse. A plaintiff who 
is threatened with unlawful conduct has standing to 
sue for an injunction, but he has no standing to sue 
for damages, because he has not yet suffered any 
damages. A plaintiff who faces threatened harm has 
27 
 
not suffered injury in fact, but he has standing to sue 
for an injunction or declaratory judgment because he 
is threatened with injury in fact that the judgment 
can prevent. See, e.g., MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, 
Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
 In claims for compensatory damages, injury in fact 
is obvious. The emphasis on injury in fact for standing 
developed in public-law suits for injunctions or 
declaratory judgments, where it is necessary to 
separate those who can appropriately sue to challenge 
government policies from those who cannot. This 
purpose is clearly stated in the cases that petitioners 
rely on most heavily.  
In Summers, the most recent of these cases, the 
context was a suit to enjoin implementation of certain 
rules of the Forest Service. The Court emphasized 
that standing rules are “founded in concern about the 
proper — and properly limited — role of the courts in 
a democratic society.” 129 S. Ct. at 1148 (quoting 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). Except 
where necessary to redress actual or threatened 
injury, “courts have no charter to review and revise 
legislative and executive action.” 129 S. Ct. at 1148.  
It was in this context that the Court said that 
“injury in fact is a hard floor of Article III jurisdiction 
that cannot be removed by statute.” Id. at 1151. This 
“hard floor” statement was immediately followed by a 
statement again focusing attention on the context: 
“[I]t would exceed [Article III’s] limitations if, at the 
behest of Congress and in the absence of any showing 
of concrete injury, we were to entertain citizen suits 
to vindicate the public’s nonconcrete interest in the 
proper administration of the laws.” Ibid. (quoting 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580-81 
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(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)) (emphasis added). 
This emphasis on concrete injury in fact makes 
sense in its original context. But plainly, the Court 
was not thinking about restitution of unjust 
enrichment in any of these opinions. Restitution of 
unjust enrichment is a different “type of relief,” with 
different requirements for standing. 
2. Standing in Suits for Restitution and 
Unjust Enrichment.  
Just as standing to sue for damages is different 
from standing to sue for an injunction, so standing to 
sue for restitution of unjust enrichment is different 
from either. Because claims for unjust enrichment are 
based on defendant’s gains rather than plaintiff’s 
losses, a focus on compensable injury or economic loss 
asks the wrong question. Either any requirement of 
injury must be abandoned in unjust enrichment 
cases, or else it must be clarified to fit the law of 
restitution and unjust enrichment. 
 The basis for standing in claims for restitution of 
unjust enrichment is that defendant made his profits 
“at the expense of” plaintiff, supra at 5, either in the 
sense of a corresponding loss to plaintiff and gain to 
defendant, or in the sense that defendant’s profits are 
derived from a violation of plaintiff’s legally protected 
rights. It matters little whether the Court describes 
this requirement as a special category of injury in fact 
or as a distinct requirement that suffices in claims for 
restitution of unjust enrichment. What is critical is 
that the Court recognize that claims to restitution of 
unjust enrichment are different from claims for 
compensatory damages and different from claims for 
injunctions, and that standing must be determined in 
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light of the nature of the claim.   
 This Court considered the standing question in 
Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115 (1991), a decision 
that petitioners badly misinterpret. Pet. Br. 33. 
Gollust was a suit to recover a corporate insider’s 
short-term trading profits under §16(b) of the 
Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §78p(b) 
(2006). The statute authorizes the issuer whose 
securities are illegally traded to recover these profits, 
and it authorizes other holders of that issuer’s 
securities to recover the profits on behalf of the issuer 
if the issuer fails to act. It is unlikely that the issuer 
suffers any compensable injury when one of its 
officers or major shareholders buys and sells in a 
six-month period, and almost unimaginable that an 
individual holder of its securities suffers compensable 
injury. But the issuer has standing to sue because its 
confidential information was misused to produce the 
trading profits. Its securities holders have standing to 
sue on the general principles of derivative suits. 
Gollust held that a derivative plaintiff in a §16(b) 
suit must continue to hold his securities in the issuer 
throughout the litigation. Otherwise, he would not 
have the necessary “personal stake” in the lawsuit 
that is essential to Article III standing. 501 U.S. at 
125-26.  
 But the “personal stake” at issue in Gollust was 
not a compensable injury or an economic loss. The 
Court quoted the requirement of “injury” to the 
plaintiff, id. at 126, but there is not the slightest hint 
in the opinion that any injury to plaintiff was 
compensable, or that it was anything more than an 
intentional violation of his legal rights that had been 
profitable to the violator. Plaintiff’s “personal stake” 
30 
 
was that “respondent still stands to profit, albeit 
indirectly, if this action is successful.” Id. at 128. 
“[H]e retains a continuing financial interest in the 
outcome of the litigation derived from his stock in 
International’s sole stockholder, Viacom, whose only 
asset is International.” Id. at 127-28. The decision 
was unanimous. 
 To have standing to sue on a restitutionary claim 
for defendant’s wrongful profits, plaintiff had to have 
a personal stake in defendant’s profits — not a 
personal stake in his own non-existent losses. Claims 
in restitution and unjust enrichment are based on 
defendant’s gains, and standing depends on plaintiff’s 
stake in those gains. 
 It does not follow that just anybody can create a 
personal stake by suing to recover a stranger’s unjust 
enrichment. The requirement that defendant’s gains 
be at plaintiff’s expense is deeply embedded in the law 
of restitution. It appears in the black letter of §1 of the 
Restatement (Third), and in the formulation of nearly 
every substantive rule of restitution and unjust 
enrichment. Even in the exceptional case of the slayer 
rule, careful attention is paid to identifying the 
appropriate plaintiff entitled to inherit in lieu of the 
slayer — a choice that is easy in most cases but 
difficult in a few. Restatement (Third) §45(3) & cmt. d. 
Only that plaintiff can sue. Self-appointed plaintiffs 
without a personal stake cannot sue. 
 These rules requiring identification of the source 
of defendant’s enrichment, or the appropriate heir in 
the case of the slayer rule, control who can be a 
plaintiff. Usually lawyers and judges think of these 
rules as simply part of the substantive rules of 
restitution and unjust enrichment — just as in 
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compensatory damages cases, they are more likely to 
think of the requirement that plaintiff prove damages 
as part of his substantive claim than as a standing 
rule. 
 But when the wrong plaintiff tries to sue, or when 
an unusual plaintiff asserts that special circum- 
stances give him the right to sue, then the court may 
talk about the identity of the restitution plaintiff in 
terms of standing. An example is Fuchs v. Bidwill, 
359 N.E.2d 158 (Ill. 1976), where the court held that 
citizens and taxpayers lacked standing to sue on 
behalf of the state for restitution of corrupt profits 
allegedly earned by state legislators. Id. at 508-10. 
The state could have sued, but individual citizens and 
taxpayers could not. 
 Standing to sue depends on the “type of relief” 
sought. The proper rule of standing in claims for 
restitution of unjust enrichment is that plaintiff have 
a personal stake in the recovery, and in all but 
exceptional cases, such as the slayer rule, that 
defendant’s gains were acquired by a violation of 
plaintiff’s legal rights. 
II. Petitioners’ Argument Would Disrupt or 
Overturn Large Bodies of Long Established 
Law with Respect to Unjust Enrichment.  
 The statutory claim in this case appears to be 
modeled on common law and equitable claims in 
restitution and unjust enrichment. Respondent 
alleges that petitioners paid a bribe to get a flow of 
business that included her, and that consequently she 
is entitled to restitution of the fees she paid for their 
services. A holding that there is no standing here 
would appear to mean that there is no standing in 
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many long established causes of action. Certainly 
petitioners offer no plausible explanation of how their 
position is consistent with the law of restitution and 
unjust enrichment. 
 It is true that respondent’s statutory claim goes 
beyond the traditional boundaries of restitution in 
some ways. The statute imposes joint and several 
liability, instead of several liability for the portion of 
plaintiff’s fees retained by each defendant. The law of 
restitution and unjust enrichment generally imposes 
only individual liability for each defendant’s enrich- 
ment, but that is not a universal rule. This Court 
imposed joint and several liability for the profits of a 
group in Jackson v. Smith, 254 U.S. 586, 589 (1921), 
citing similar earlier cases. And Mosser v. Darrow, 
341 U.S. 267 (1951), described supra at 14, imposed 
vicarious liability in unjust enrichment on a defen- 
dant who had no personal profits at all — a result 
that goes well beyond joint and several liability. 
Whether petitioners’ liability is joint and several or 
only several has nothing to do with respondent’s 
personal stake in the litigation, and nothing to do 
with whether petitioners’ enrichment was at 
respondent’s expense — in short, nothing to do with 
standing. 
 The statutory claim also goes beyond a restitution 
claim by adding a punitive element; petitioners will 
be liable, if at all, for three times the fees received. 
But there is nothing unusual about this. It is settled 
that in appropriate cases, a claim for restitution of 
unjust enrichment can be combined with a claim for 
punitive damages, and that plaintiff can recover both. 
Restatement (Third) §51 cmt. k and reporter’s note k; 
see, e.g., Ward v. Taggart, 336 P.2d 534, 538-39 (Cal. 
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1959) (Traynor, J.). And here too, Congress’s decision 
to combine restitutionary and punitive elements in a 
single claim has nothing whatever to do with 
respondent’s standing. 
 The Court must decide this case with careful 
attention to the vast body of law on restitution and 
unjust enrichment. Respondent appears to have a 
personal stake in recovery of fees paid to a service 
provider that, respondent alleges, collected those fees 
in a transaction that violated statutory rules designed 
to protect customers like her. Either the Court must 
uphold standing to assert that claim, or it must 
carefully and convincingly distinguish that claim 
from the many long established claims in unjust 
enrichment on behalf of plaintiffs who suffered no 
compensable injury. 
 An opinion requiring injury in fact, and suggesting 
that injury in fact requires a compensable injury or 
an economic loss, would overturn centuries of Anglo- 
American law. All the cases discussed above (in part 
I.B.2) would appear to be barred from federal court if 
this Court were to adopt petitioners’ argument. 
Where a restitution plaintiff can prove compensable 
injury, the claim could proceed — but requiring such 
proof in a claim for restitution of unjust enrichment 
would fundamentally change the lawsuit, adding a 
previously irrelevant issue to every plaintiff’s burden 
of proof. 
 Many federal claims would be barred or 
fundamentally changed — claims to recover bribes 
paid to federal employees, claims for infringement of 
copyright, trademark, and design patents, claims to 
recover the profits of trading on inside information, 
claims to recover short-term trading profits by 
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insiders, and more. Many state-law claims would be 
appear to be barred from the diversity jurisdiction. 
 Many states have similar standing rules for 
litigation in state court, often following or visibly 
influenced by this Court’s decisions.7 Future defen- 
dants would argue the persuasive value of this 
Court’s decision in state court; every state would have 
to decide whether to preserve the traditional rules of 
restitution and unjust enrichment or to follow this 
Court’s lead and bar many such claims. Of course this 
Court is not responsible for state law. But the Court 
should think carefully before it bars many state-law 
claims from federal court and throws large swathes of 
state law into potential chaos. 
 
  
                     
7 See, e.g. Grayson v. AT&T Corp., 15 A.3d 219, 233-35 (D.C. 
2011); Corboy v. Louie, 2011 WL 1687364, *12-16 (Haw. 2011); 
Ciszek v. Kootenai County Board of Commissioners, 254 P.3d 24, 
29-30 (Idaho 2011); Patuxent Riverkeeper v. Maryland Depart- 
ment of Environment, 2011 WL 4502141, *1-8 (Md. 2011); In re 
Custody of D.T.R., 796 N.W.2d 509, 512-13 (Minn. 2011); 
Heffernan v. Missoula City Council, 255 P.3d 80, 91-92 (Mont. 
2011); Frenchman-Cambridge Irrigation District v. Department 
of Natural Resources, 801 N.W.2d 253, 258-60 (Neb. 2011); San 
Juan Agricultural Water Users Ass’n v. KNME-TV, 257 P.3d 884, 




 The judgment below should be affirmed. And the 
Court’s opinion should take care to preserve the long 
established law of restitution and unjust enrichment. 
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